A foundation with a few cracks
A review of Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview by
J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig
Inter-Varsity Press, 2003
reviewed by Andrew Kulikovsky
This massive tome is the product of two of the leading Christian philosophers from
the evangelical tradition. Both Moreland and Craig are philosophy professors at
Talbot School of Theology, Biola University. Their book aims to present a rigorous
philosophical justification for not just the existence of God, but the existence
of the God of the Christian Bible. In doing so, the authors also expound the basic
underlying concepts of knowledge, rationality, morality, truth, good and evil, mind
and body, which make it possible to know and to reason.
The book is divided into six parts: Part I provides an introduction to philosophy,
argument and logic. Part II discusses epistemology—the concept of knowledge
and the possibility of knowing. Part III explores metaphysical questions—what
exists and what is real? Part IV examines the philosophy of science. Part V considers
the philosophical bases behind various theories of ethics, and part VI expounds
the philosophical basis for Christian theism.
Why discuss philosophy?
The mere mention of the word ‘philosophy’ usually causes most people
to switch right off. What is even more disturbing is that, when Christians hear
this word, many turn antagonistic! It is unfortunate that many Christians today
have—for a variety of reasons—tended toward anti-intellectualism: an
open disparaging of intellectual and academic endeavours.
Thus, it is not surprising that the authors begin by highlighting the value of philosophical
study. The truth is that everyone is influenced by philosophical ideas—either
their own or someone else’s—whether they realise it or not. Belief in
God is a philosophical idea. Reading the Bible (or any other book for that matter)
in the belief that it communicates intelligible information (as opposed to gibberish)
assumes the truth of a number of philosophical concepts. Ultimately, our views about
life, death, reality, good, evil, right, wrong, justice, psychology, mathematics,
education, society, etc. are all informed by philosophical ideas and discussions—even
if we are not aware of it. This is precisely why it is essential for all Christians
to have at least some knowledge of the philosophical foundations of their faith.
Those who do not will either fall away, become insulated and ineffectual witnesses,
or—even worse—hold syncretistic and heretical views which they then
propound throughout the church as being the Christian or biblical view.
This book is extremely detailed and comprehensive (it is 654 pages in length), and
space does not permit a thorough evaluation of all its content. Therefore, my comments
will focus on key chapters and other sections that will be of interest to creationists.
Formal logic and theories
of truth
Chapter 2 of Part I presents an introduction to formal logic and logical reasoning
that covers both deductive and inductive reasoning. This chapter is very well written,
with good explanations and examples. There is much to be gained from spending the
time and effort to carefully study it. However, the one weakness of this chapter
is that—apart from the fallacy of affirming the consequent—it does not
cover the myriad of other common logical fallacies. This is a critical omission
because much of what passes for logical argument these days, in popular culture,
in academia, in the church pulpit, and in Christian publications, is riddled with
logical fallacies.
In chapter 6 of Part II, the authors discuss theories of truth and postmodernism,
and rightly argue for the correspondence theory of truth, i.e. that a proposition
is true if and only if it corresponds to actual reality. The chapter also includes
basic critiques of relativism and postmodernism.
The philosophy of science
Part IV covers the philosophy of science, and its first chapter examines scientific
methodology. However, the authors’ treatment of the scientific method is surprisingly
shallow, naïve and unsophisticated. They appear to treat science as a discipline
that has arisen independently of Christianity and for which Christianity has to
been forced to ‘interact’ with:
‘If Christians are going to speak to the modern world and interact with it
responsibly, they must interact with science. And if believers are going to explore
God’s world by means of science and integrate their theological beliefs with
the results of that exploration, they need a deeper understanding of science itself’
(p. 307).
However, there is only passing reference to the philosophical and intellectual origins
of science as being rooted in the Christian worldview. Science requires an orderly
and real universe, consistent with a God of order (1 Cor. 14:33), and the right to investigate creation (Gen. 1:28). So it is not surprising that, as Rodney
Stark noted, science arose in history once and only in the Christian West.1
Moreland and Craig make only passing, or no reference at all, to important work
in the area of philosophy of science, such as Thomas Kuhn’s examination of
the problems regarding the scientific method and the truth claims of scientists,
and Michael Polanyi’s criticism of the notion that scientific method can supply
us with objective truths.
In response to their question: ‘How should science and theology interact?’(p.
307), surely the Christian response should be guided by truth, not by some artificial
model of interaction. Rather, the question that should occupy every Christian’s
mind when assessing any truth claim—be it from science or the Bible—must
be ‘is this the truth?’
Moreland and Craig rightly reject naïve inductivism as an adequate scientific
method, and opt instead for the ‘hypothetico-deductive method’ where
the scientist puts forward a hypothesis along with a set of tests that could be
used to verify or falsify that hypothesis. But what they fail to point out is that
a mere explanation—even one that is derived from scientific data and observations—is
not a proof. The history of science reveals that many scientific explanations have
turned out to be wrong—indeed, spectacularly wrong.
In regard to the history of science, they make only passing reference to Thomas
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.2 Kuhn’s book
is one of the key works on the philosophy, history and development of the scientific
method. Kuhn examined how science has actually been conducted in history, and his
historical observations have highlighted numerous philosophical and psychological
issues regarding the scientific method and the truth claims of scientists. His main
thesis is that most scientific research has been conducted within a paradigm, and
only in rare periods of ‘scientific revolution’ is the paradigm overturned
by the weight of anomalies and replaced by a new one. None of these important observations
are really taken up by the authors in their analysis.
Another notable exclusion is Michael Polanyi. There is no reference at all to his
devastating critique of logical positivism—the view that the only authentic
knowledge is that which is gained through positive affirmation by strictly applying
the scientific method. In his book, Personal Knowledge,3 Polanyi embraced
the existence of objective truth—something that is surely central to the Christian
worldview. Moreover, Polanyi also criticised the notion that the scientific method
could mechanistically supply us with such objective truths. Perhaps the reason why
Moreland and Craig chose to ignore Polanyi’s work is because they (and many
other Christian philosophers and theologians) tend to believe that the scientific
method can indeed mechanistically supply us with such truths.
In their discussion of the formation of scientific ideas, Moreland and Craig never
explicitly acknowledge that ideology often plays a big role, although they do perhaps
hint at it when they state that metaphysical and theological views may guide a scientist.
Again, they note the various ways scientists explain observations and empirical
data, but they do not acknowledge that scientific explanations are simply explanations,
nothing more. They are not proofs. That an explanation fully accounts for all observations
and even predicts future observations is no guarantee that the explanation is in
fact a true representation of reality. This point has been demonstrated time and
again in the history of science. Indeed, it is also an example of a common logical
fallacy known as ‘affirming the consequent’ which Moreland and Craig
discuss in their chapter on formal logic. In other words, the fact that scientists
assert that some hypothesis, H, predicts some event, E, and that event is observed,
it does not necessarily mean that hypothesis, H, is true.
The authors rightly acknowledge the difference between historical (origin) science
and empirical (operational) science, and that collecting data from experiments often
involves interpretation in the light of a host of theoretical background assumptions
about what is being observed and the instruments used to observe it. They also rightly
reject scientism (the belief that scientific truth is the most authoritative truth)
in both its strong and weak flavours, although I have to wonder—in light of
some of their other comments—whether they actually hold to this rejection
of scientism in practice.
Moreland and Craig note that the uniformity of nature is one of the presuppositions
of the scientific enterprise. But in the Christian worldview, the strict uniformity
of nature cannot be sustained because it excludes the possibility of miracles, or
any other form of supernatural activity. Of course, Christians can believe in general
uniformity because God has created an orderly universe, but they must still allow
for divine intervention.
Integrating theology
and science
In any case, Moreland and Craig suggest there are six (not necessarily mutually
exclusive) models for ‘integrating’ science and theology: (1) science
and theology focus on two entirely different areas of investigation; (2) science
and theology are two different but complementary approaches to looking at the same
reality, and only contradict when one intrudes onto the other’s territory;
(3) science fills out details in theology or helps to apply theological principles
and vice versa; (4) theology provides metaphysical and epistemological foundation
for science by justifying or helping to justify science’s necessary presuppositions;
(5) science provides boundaries in which theology must work, and science can inform
theology but theology has nothing to add to science; and (6) science and theology
involve descriptions that can directly interact with each other in mutually reinforcing
or competing ways. They argue that all these views may be appropriate in different
circumstances, and, with a number of qualifications. But in light of the qualifications
they give, and in view of science’s philosophical basis and historical experience,
there is a much simpler model that incorporates all of the above: The truth claims
of theology based on sound exegesis of the biblical text (using the historical-grammatical
method of interpretation upon which all meaningful human communication is based)
are superior to all other competing truth claims, and scientific truth claims are
only valid and reliable when they describe natural processes or phenomena where
God has not chosen to directly act or intervene.
Young-earth creationists consistently hold to the authority and inerrancy of scripture,
and that scientific data must be interpreted in relation to what the Scriptures
teach
Regarding the disagreements between progressive creationists and young-earth creationists,
Moreland and Craig assert that the main issues are the interpretation of the Hebrew
word yôm (‘day’), the age of the universe, and the ‘usefulness
of the flood for doing geology’ (p. 354). This is not just extremely simplistic,
it is inaccurate. The fundamental difference is where the two groups place the most
authority. Young-earth creationists consistently hold to the authority and inerrancy
of scripture, and that scientific data must be interpreted in relation to what the
Scriptures teach, following the integration principle I specified above. Progressive
creationists, on the other hand, although they affirm the authority and inerrancy
of scripture, do not hold to it consistently and often pay only lip service to it
when interpreting the early chapters of Genesis. Their exegesis is guided by the
premise that it is an absolute incontrovertible scientific fact that the universe
is around 12 billion years old, the earth is around 4 billion years old, and Noah’s
Flood, whether global or local, had negligible impact on the earth’s topography.
The Intelligent Design movement
Regarding the Intelligent Design (ID) movement, the authors give the impression
that this is a relatively new and fresh creationist movement. This is nonsense.
The ID movement dates back to the time of William Paley (and design arguments go
back much further, e.g. Cicero, Gregory of Nazianzus, Thomas Aquinas) and has been
advanced by every significant young-earth creationist advocate ever since. The only
thing that is ‘new’ about the ID movement is that progressive creationists
and some theistic evolutionists also participate in this movement.
Moreland and Craig do offer a very good and thorough response to the ‘god-of-the-gaps’
objection often raised against creationists (cf. pp. 120–7), as well as a
refutation to the objection that creationist thinking and assumptions leads to a
stifling of general curiosity, and therefore inhibits potentially fruitful lines
of scientific research.
In summary though, their analysis of the philosophy of science is greatly lacking,
and they appear to have little appreciation of the impact of the limitedness of
human knowledge and understanding, and the fallenness of humanity, on our ability
to observe, to interpret and to reason. They also tend to play down the role of
biblical revelation, and exaggerate the value and reliability of scientific data.
Philosophy of time and space
This is another topic that Craig has written on extensively, and the material in
this book is largely lifted straight from these previously published works.4
Craig follows Newton in holding that God occupies a special space-time frame of
reference called ‘absolute’ space-time. Furthermore, Craig rejects Einstein’s
special theory of relativity in favour of Lorentzian relativity because Einstein’s
theory implies that no such special reference frame exists. They stop short, however,
of endorsing Newton’s views on divine eternity and omnipresence. But why think
that God is constrained by space-time at all, especially in light of Genesis 1:1? If God created everything ‘In the beginning’
(of time), then time had a beginning at the point at which God created. In other
words, God not only created space, he also created time.
Craig (and presumably Moreland) favour the A-theory (or tensed view) of time over
the B-theory (or tenseless view) of time. They begin defending the A-theory by appealing
to common experience of temporal reality: that we experience things in the here
and now; the past consists of events that have already occurred, and the future
has not yet happened. They assert that this common experience is a properly basic
belief which is reasonably justified and should be accepted prima facie,
unless and until it is defeated. This is very weak argument. Our common experience
is that world is governed by naturalistic events and processes, and therefore it
would be reasonably justified to prima facie accept methodological naturalism
as the governing principle of scientific investigation, but I doubt Craig and Moreland
would accept that line of argument.
Photo by Darren Hester, www.morguefile.com
William Lane Craig follows Newton in holding that God occupies a special spacetime
frame of reference called ‘absolute’ space-time. But why think that
God is constrained by space-time at all, especially in light of Genesis 1:1? God
not only created space, he also created time.
Moreland and Craig attack the B-theory by attacking D.H. Mellor’s defence
of it. Mellor argued that there really is no such thing as the present despite our
common experience. But Mellor’s theory is clearly inadequate. There is no
need for a B-theorist to deny that our experiences are present. A B-theorist need
only take issue with what ‘the present’ actually refers to. I am reading
Moreland’s and Craig’s book ‘in the present’. When Moreland
and Craig actually wrote it, it was ‘in the present.’ But these two
‘events’ did not occur at the same time! Thus, the present is a relative
concept. Although it is a common experience, it’s specific meaning and significance
is unique to each particular person. Likewise, events that we have already experienced
are ‘in the past’, and events we are yet to experience are in the future.
Craig argues: ‘On the B-theory of time, feelings of relief and anticipation
must be ultimately regarded as irrational, since events are really not past or future.’
He argues that the B-theory implies there is no objective ‘here’ or
‘now’ and no sense of temporal becoming or of moving toward one event
and away from another. But this line of argument indicates Craig’s deep confusion
over what the B-theory means and implies. Moreover, it appears that Craig presumes
that the B-theory of time constrains not only human beings but also God.
The B-theory posits that time is a series of temporal moments with a beginning and
an ending. In a Christian worldview, this entire series of temporal moments was
created at once by God. As Creator, this series is external to God and He is not
subject to it. However, all of God’s creatures, including human beings, are
created in space-time and therefore are constrained by it. God’s creatures
would experience temporal becoming (just like the A-theory) throughout their lifetime
(which would consist of a limited span of consecutive temporal moments from the
entire temporal series which makes up all of history). Thus, feelings of relief
and anticipation are not irrational. A person feels relief when they have experienced
pain or stress in the immediate past, but no longer experience those sensations
in the present. A person feels anticipation when they have a strong and reasonable
belief that they about to experience something that they are, or are not, looking
forward to. These feelings are responses to the events (including knowledge of impending
pain or impending joy) in the temporal sequence they ‘presently’ experience
in their subjective space-time frame of reference.
The tenselessness of time in the B-theory is not detectable to those who are constrained
by it. It is only noticeable to God who stands outside of time. The whole series
of temporal moments on the B-theory of time exist ‘tenselessly’ in relation
to God. Although all the temporal moments in the sequence occur ‘tenselessly’
with God, that does not mean they occur tenselessly in relation to each other. Because
God stands outside of time, he can observe and act at any moment in the created
sequence. For Him, there is no such thing as an objective ‘here’ and
‘now’ or ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’.
These terms only have objective meaning inside the space-time continuum, and simply
describe the relationships between particular actors and specific events. Nevertheless,
even though God stands outside of time and the temporal sequence exists ‘tenselessly’
with Him, He is still able to identify one particular event as being earlier than,
or later than, some other event. Indeed, this view of the B-theory of time is essentially
the same as that described by Cambridge philosopher John Ellis McTaggart in 1908.
However, Craig responds with the following argument:
‘McTaggart observes that pastness, presentness and futurity are mutually incompatible:
no event can have all three. But given McTaggart’s tenselessly existing series
of temporal events, every event does have all three! Take an event tenselessly located
at t1. At t1 that event is obviously present. But because all
events are equally real, the event also has pastness and futurity because at t2
it is past and t0 it is future. The moment t1 is not any more
real or privileged than t0 or t2, and the event in question must
be characterised by the tenses it has at all these times, which is impossible’
(p. 388).
But this is like arguing that it is impossible to be a certain age, and yet at the
same time be older than my son, and younger than my father! Craig is being disingenuous
here. If the event at t1 is the present experience of a particular actor,
then that event is only ‘past’ with respect to t2, and future
with respect to t0. It is NOT inherently past or inherently
future. Nor, for that matter is it inherently present. It is only present for the
particular actor experiencing that event.
Craig also notes that the Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity implies
a B-theory of time. However, he argues that the General Theory of Relativity should
only be understood instrumentally—as a tool—rather than as a realistic
description of the universe. This is a curious statement from Craig given that he
had no problem accepting the objective reality of the General Theory of Relativity
when he appeals to big-bang cosmology in his defence of the Kalām
Cosmological Argument!
The existence of God
Chapter 23 deals with the Cosmological argument and is largely a summary of Craig’s
previously published work on this topic. As I have documented elsewhere, Craig’s
defence of the Cosmological argument is seriously flawed.5
Chapter 24 deals with other arguments for the existence of God including the Teleological,
Axiological and Ontological arguments. The Teleological argument is essentially
the argument from design and the apparent fine tuning of the universe. The weakness
of this argument, however, is that it does not and cannot reveal the identity of
the Designer, nor does it necessarily imply a personal God. Indeed, most people
who have found this argument persuasive have retreated to deism rather than theism
(most famous is the ID movement’s recent trophy case, the leading former atheistic
philosopher Antony Flew).
People may disagree over whether some specific notion is an objective moral value,
but they cannot honestly deny such moral values exist.
The axiological argument is one which I find most compelling. It is based on the
assumption that there are, in fact, objective moral values. Even in our increasingly
postmodern society this is not really a problem because not even the most ardent
postmodernist can seriously deny that torturing babies for fun is objectively wrong!
People may disagree over whether some specific notion is an objective moral value,
but they cannot honestly deny such moral values exist. Given that objective moral
values exist, the only way their existence can be explained is by their origin in
God, which, of course, implies that He exists. The atheist/humanist has no explanation
for the origin and existence of such objective moral values. This is a powerful
argument if it is explained and argued clearly, and this section in the book will
certainly aid the reader in doing this.
Their discussion of the Ontological argument is relatively brief. In this argument,
God is the maximally excellent and perfect being in every possible world, including
the real world, or as Anselm put it, ‘that than which nothing greater can
be conceived.’ Anselm argued that something existing in reality is greater
than that which exists in the mind, so ‘that than which nothing greater can
be conceived’ cannot just exist in the mind. Anselm identifies this with God.
In many respects, the argument is somewhat question-begging, so is not an independently
powerful argument for the existence of God. However, as the authors point out, it
is a good supporting argument when combined with the other arguments.
The remaining chapters examine the coherence of theism and look specifically at
God’s attributes, the problem of evil, creation, providence and miracle, and
specific Christian doctrines including the Trinity and the Incarnation. Chapter
28 examines the case for divine creation ex nihilo. Again, this material
is a condensed version of the material in one of Craig’s other books that
he co-authored with Paul Copan and which I have also recently reviewed in this journal.5
There are a number of other theological issues discussed in these later chapters,
of which the solutions or explanations offered, I would take serious issue with.
However, a detailed discussion would take many more pages. Suffice to say that,
in relation to many of the theological issues Moreland and Craig cover, one would
do better to consult one of the standard evangelical systematic theologies available
today, and especially Carl Henry’s multi-volume magnum opus God, Revelation
and Authority.6
Summary
For an academic work, it is odd that there are very few footnotes or references.
There are, however, lists of further readings for each chapter listed in a section
at the end of the book.
In addition, one very nice feature of the book is the summaries and keyword checklists
at the end of each chapter. These serve as a good way for the reader to confirm
that they have understood and grasped the basic points and principle outlines in
the chapter.
Nevertheless, I was a little disappointed with this work—particularly the
contributions of Craig. For such a large and apparently comprehensive work, many
of the discussions still appear to be superficial. There are, however, many good
discussions, and it would probably serve well as a good introductory work, but one
would need to do a lot more reading in order to get a complete or more thorough
grasp of many of the issues.
Related articles
References
- Stark, R., For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to
Reformations, Science, Witch-hunts and the End of Slavery, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ, p. 197, 2003; see review, Williams, A., The biblical origins
of science, J. Creation 18(2):49–52, 2004; <creation.com/stark>.
Return to text.
- Kuhn, T.S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
3rd edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1996. Return
to text.
- Polanyi, M., Personal Knowledge, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, IL, 1974. Return to text.
- See, for example, Craig, W.L., God, Time and Eternity,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2001. Return
to text.
- See my review of the book he co-authored with Paul Copan:
Kulikovsky, A., ‘Argumentum ad nihilum:
argument amount to nothing’, Journal of Creation 21(1):20–26,
2007. Return to text.
- Henry, C.F.H., God, Revelation and Authority (6 vols.),
Crossway, Wheaton, IL, 1999. Return to text.
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